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Abstract 
The literature on recommender systems mainly focuses on product recommendation 
where buyer’s preferences are considered. However, for user recommendation in two-
sided matching markets, potential matches’ preferences may also play a role in focal 
user’s decision-making. Hence, we seek to understand the impact of providing potential 
candidates’ preference in such settings. In collaboration with an online dating platform, 
we design and conduct a randomized field experiment and present users with 
recommendations based on i) their own preferences, ii) potential matches’ preferences, 
or iii) mutual preferences. Interestingly, we find that users are sensitive to the provision 
of potential candidates’ preferences, and they proactively reach out to those “who might 
prefer them” despite those candidates’ relatively lower desirability. This leads to a 
greater improvement in matching. The findings provide valuable insights on how to 
design user recommendation systems beyond the current practice of recommendations 
based on focal user’s preferences. 
Keywords: Recommender systems, two-sided matching platforms, preference 
information, strategic behavior, randomized field experiments 
Introduction 
Peer-to-peer two-sided matching markets have become major players across many industries, e.g., labor 
markets, crowd-funding, and online dating. With the rapid growth of these markets, the choices for users 
expand exponentially exacerbating search frictions. Consequently, platforms resort to personalized 
recommender systems as one of the most effective approaches to improve the efficiency of search and 
matching. While researchers and practitioners generally focus on product recommendations in 
transactional markets, there is a dearth of research that studies user recommendations in two-sided 
matching markets. 
User recommendation in two-sided matching markets differs from product recommendation in 
transactional markets due to some fundamental characteristics that distinguish the two types of markets. 
First, a match on a two-sided matching platform is a bilateral decision, as opposed to a purchasing 
decision in E-commerce, that eventually depends on the preferences of both sides of the markets - focal 
users on one side vs. potential matches on the other side (e.g., employers vs. employees in a labor market, 
or men vs. women in a dating market). Given this two-sided nature, focal users may make different 
choices when the recommendations are generated based on the other side’s preference. Another 
distinction relates to the bandwidth issue of recommendations, especially those in high demand. In 
transactional markets, a popular item (say, a best-seller) can be recommended to multiple users. 
However, it is not ideal for matching markets to recommend the same popular candidate to many 
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potential partners since only a few are likely to get a response. This congestion may lead to fewer matches 
for the platform as the whole.  
Clearly, when designing user recommendations on two-sided matching platforms, more attention needs 
to be paid on the candidate pool regarding what preference information is used and how it impacts the 
platform as a whole. Yet, most online matching platforms provide recommendations similar to that of 
transactional platforms – their recommendations are largely based on the preferences of the focal user 
(Horton, 2017). It may not be the optimal practice, considering the differences between the two types of 
markets. Previous studies in Economics and Information Systems have provided some theoretical and 
empirical pointers to the potential benefits by including the other side’s preferences. The findings suggest 
that providing the information about the other side’s preferences can lead to strategic behaviors of the 
focal users and such provisioning is likely to improve matching outcomes (Avery & Levin, 2010; Bapna et 
al., 2016; Cole et al., 2013). However, there have been no field studies that empirically examine its 
implications for the design of recommender systems in two-sided matching markets. 
We seek to bridge this gap and start by investigating how the usage of potential matches’ preferences in 
recommender systems impacts focal users’ decision-making. Specifically, we seek to understand what 
preference information should be used in recommender systems and how it impacts user decision-making 
and matching outcomes. From the perspective of choices and preferences, the research question can be 
viewed as in two-sided matching markets, whether and how people make different choices when the 
choice set includes or precludes the other side’s preferences. From the perspective of information 
provisioning, we can think of the question as to whether and how users’ decisions are affected when the 
other side’ preferences are made available. The choice sets and the preference information presented to 
the focal users here are generated by recommender systems. 
Three recommender systems are developed to examine how focal users respond differently. The first 
system uses focal users’ preference (“Your Preferences”). The second system is based on potential 
matches’ preferences (“Potential Matches’ Preferences”). The third takes mutual preferences into 
consideration (“Mutual Preferences”). All other elements of the three recommender systems are held the 
same, including the feature set and the prediction model, to make comparisons meaningful. In other 
words, the three recommender systems only differ in the input data for candidate generation, by using the 
preference information of the different sides. 
To examine the research question based on real user behavior, we collaborate with one of the leading 
online dating platforms in the U.S. and design and conduct a randomized field experiment. We choose 
online dating as the representative context not only due to its prevalence but also due to its flexibility to 
conduct randomized field experiments compared to other matching markets (Coles et al., 2010; Hitsch et 
al., 2010). Besides the three treatment groups that respectively implement the three recommendation 
systems, there is a control group with a baseline model. As opposed to the common baseline choice that 
shows a random list of users, we modify it to randomly show the top popular users to serve as a “higher” 
baseline. To avoid carry-over effects, we adopt a between-subject design that makes sure every subject is 
assigned only to one group of the experiment. Furthermore, the treatment contains two inseparable 
elements1: 1) recommendations generated by the assigned recommender system, which, compared to the 
recommender systems in other treatment groups, only differs in the preference information used as input, 
and 2) the associated title of the assigned recommender system to inform users what preference 
information is used to generate the recommendations. This study seeks to provide design implications for 
two-sided matching platforms on what preference information should be used, so the recommendation 
content needs to be truly based on different preferences rather than merely a manipulation of framings 
without changing the content. This is consistent with the literature on preference signals (Avery & Levin, 
2010; Cole et al., 2013), which notes that the information has to be ‘transparent’ to the focal users for it to 
be effective. Finally, users are also informed that the ordering of the candidates is based on the fitness of 
the designated preference. For instance, in “People who might prefer you” group, candidates on the top 
have a higher likelihood of preferring the focal users than the candidates on the bottom.  
                                                             
1 It would be interesting to separate the two elements and examine only one of them. However, these are 
beyond the interest and goal of this paper and can be pursued as future directions.  
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In examining the effects, we find that users are responsive to “the other side’s preferences,” which leads to 
both quantitative and qualitative impacts on the platform. Specifically, users in the “People who might 
prefer you” group and “Mutual Preferences” group are as proactive as users in the “Your Preferences” 
group; they all initiate more messages to the recommended candidates than in the control group. 
Interestingly, we further observe that focal users in the “Potential Matches’ Preferences” group and 
“Mutual Preferences” groups tend to choose the candidates who are more likely to prefer them regardless 
of these candidates’ desirability whereas people in “Your Preferences” group tend to seek highly desirable 
candidates. It is worth mentioning that in our study, users are not bounded by the limited 
recommendation choices; the platform provides a target search tool that ensures that every subject has 
the same opportunity to look for desirable partners. Interestingly, given the equal search access to all 
users on the platform, the qualitative difference of message receivers across groups only happens among 
those recommended candidates, not the candidates from search results. It further assures that those focal 
users in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” are not switching to lower desirable 
users in general but are responding to the recommended candidates who are more likely to “prefer” them. 
Our results indicate that users value the other side’s preference and act upon it when such information is 
available.  
The positive effect on message initiation by using “the other side’s preference” is further amplified in the 
examination of responses and matches as the message receivers in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and 
“Mutual Preferences” groups respond more to the message proposals. We find that while “Your 
Preferences” group receives more responses than the control group, “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and 
“Mutual Preferences” groups even outperform “Your Preferences” group. Therefore, providing the other 
side’s preferences (“Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences”) does lead to more matches 
than only considering the focal user’s preferences (“Your Preferences”). Such an increase may result from 
the novelty and diversity of choices generated by “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual 
Preferences” recommender systems, motivating focal users to explore and finally convert to matches. It 
may also be likely that users react strategically to the newly added information of the other side’s 
preference; they tend to maximize the replies and matches. Further, there are heterogeneous effects 
wherein users who search broadly benefit more from “People who might prefer you” and “Mutual 
Preferences” recommendations, whereas “Your Preferences” benefits users who search narrowly.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, it is among the 
first to examine the design and impact of user recommendation in a two-sided matching market that is 
fundamentally different from product recommendations. Second, it extends the literature on preference 
information disclosure and preference signaling to a new setting where the preference on the other side is 
provided by the platform’s recommendation system. Further, we are among the first to design and 
conduct a randomized field experiment to investigate user recommendations in a two-sided matching 
market. It allows us to observe users’ real-world choices and matching outcomes. These findings provide 
valuable implications to two-sided matching platforms and highlight the significance of including the 
other side’s preference in the recommender systems. Such inclusion not only helps to improve user 
engagement and matching outcomes but also potentially reduces the disproportionate focus on the most 
popular users due to the diversity of users that are recommended as potential candidates for matching. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, prior work is reviewed to outline our contributions. The research 
context is then described to provide details on the online dating platform as a representative of the two-
sided matching markets. It is followed by a discussion of our experimental design as well as the details of 
the recommender systems we deploy. Variables and results are presented, and we conclude with 
managerial implications. 
Prior Literature  
Our paper closely relates to three streams of research. The first two streams of work examine 
recommender systems from different perspectives; one from the business perspective of recommender 
systems on how they impact users and platforms, and the other from the technical perspective of optimal 
design of recommender systems. The third stream of research draws upon studies on preference 
information provision and preference signaling to serve as the theoretical underpinning for how focal 
users may make choices differently when the recommendations are generated using different preference 
information.  
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There is emerging literature in the domains of information systems and economics that examines how 
recommender systems change users and online markets. Researchers have been focusing on either the 
quantitative or the qualitative side of the impact. On the one hand, researchers have found a positive 
effect of recommender systems on sales (Fleder and Hosanagar, 2009; De et al., 2010; Oestreicher-Singer 
and Sundararajan, 2012). On the other hand, some studies investigate how recommender systems shape 
consumers’ choices – whether the introduction of recommender systems leads to more fragmented or 
unified choices collectively. However, mixed results are reported in different markets and contexts. For 
instance, Brynjolfsson et al. (2011) find that recommender systems lead to an increase in sales diversity 
while Hosanagar et al. (2014) find that it leads to an increase in commonality in music choices. Moreover, 
several studies have shown the co-existence of an increase in diversity and an increase in commonality, 
albeit on different levels of analysis (Fleder and Hosanagar, 2009; Lee and Hosanagar, 2014). The 
existing studies along this line focus mostly on product recommendations in transactional markets. Given 
the distinctive market characteristics of two-sided matching markets, our study seeks to be among the 
first to examine user recommendation in this setting. We complement this line of research by examining 
both the quantitative and qualitative impacts on user’s decision-making in a two-sided matching market.  
In contrast to studying the business impact, studies from computer science focus on the performance of 
recommender systems algorithms. Some recent papers have proposed recommendation algorithms for 
matching problems (Pizzato, et al., 2010; Xia, et al., 2015). As our focus is to investigate when using the 
same algorithm, how different sources of preferences would impact users’ choices and matches 
differently, we adopt an existing algorithm in Pizzato et al.’s (2010) to obtain established recommendation 
performance. From the design aspect, we make additional effort to reduce biases of favoring popular users 
and confounding factors of inferring preference. From the evaluation aspect, existing studies evaluate new 
algorithms using secondary data while we design and conduct a randomized online field experiment to 
observe users’ real choices and matches.  
Further, we draw from the emerging literature on preference disclosure and preference signaling in 
Economics and Information Systems to provide supporting evidence that incorporating the other side’s 
preferences in the recommender systems may be beneficial to the users and the platform. There is 
empirical evidence that presenting a focal user with information regarding the preferences of another user 
tends to increase the chance of a match between the two (Avery & Levin, 2010; Bapna et al. 2016). Such 
provision of the other side’s preferences serves as a weak signal that prompts focal users to proactively 
connect with potential matches. Some theoretical work also suggests that the focal users would be more 
likely to accept one’s proposal if it comes along with a credible signal of preferences (Cole et al., 2013). 
These theoretical and empirical pieces of evidence support the fact that a focal user’s decision-making 
may be affected by the awareness of the other side’s preference in a matching market. However, in the 
existing studies, the preference signal sent to the focal users is directly from another user, e.g., a proposal 
or a profile visit. It is not clear how focal users react when the preference of the other side is based on 
predictions, and when the preference signal is sent by the platform. Our study, therefore, extends this line 
of literature with a relaxed condition of predicted preference information.  
Methods and Data 
Research Context  
We collaborate with one of the leading online dating platforms in the U.S, which has more than 1 million 
registered users. As with most online dating websites, it offers the following features to users. First, users 
can create their own online profiles to introduce themselves. User profiles typically also include photos. 
Moreover, the platform offers a decentralized search tool wherein users can filter profiles by age, location, 
and other demographic attributes to find potential matches. These targeted search results can be sorted 
based on location distance or user tenure from registration. Users are able to browse others’ profiles 
without limitations and at no cost. There is no personalization or recommendation on this platform before 
our experiment.  
Experimental Design  
Based on preference information from the two sides on the platform (focal users on one side vs. potential 
matches on the other side), we compare three recommendation algorithms that are based on 1) focal 
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users’ preference (“Your Preferences”), 2) the other side’s preferences (“Potential Matches’ Preference”), 
and 3) mutual preferences (“Mutual Preferences”) respectively. Since we are interested in how 
information about the different preferences impact user’s decision-making, we use the same features and 
the same recommendation model but only alter the input information by leveraging preferences from 
different sides of the market. The control group outputs the top popular users in a random order to create 
a better baseline group than the commonly used benchmark - “generating a random list of users” as it 
makes sure the provided options are of high quality. The recommendation system is newly added to the 
platform, and the targeted search function remains in use without any changes. We also make careful 
design considerations to account for other factors contributing to users’ choices. As suggested by the 
literature on decision-making, the size of the choice set plays a role. Therefore, we fix the number of 
recommendations for all the four recommendation algorithms. We also limit this number to be a 
reasonable size (i.e., 100 users) because too many choices may increase the complexity in decision-making 
due to bounded rationality.  
To inform users how the recommendations are generated, a title is provided. “Your Preferences” group 
shows “People you might prefer” while “Potential Matches’ Preferences” group uses “People who might 
prefer you.” “Mutual Preferences” group displays “People who you might prefer and who might prefer 
you,” and control group says “System Recommendation.” It is important to disclose this information to 
make sure that users are aware of whether or not the choices are incorporated with the other side’s 
preference. Otherwise, the strategic behavior documented in the previous literature would not be induced. 
In addition, the users are also informed regarding the sorting of the recommendations in each group, 
which is based on how compatible these candidates are with the designated preference. Specifically, the 
candidates shown at the top in “Your Preference” group have a higher chance of fitting focal users’ own 
preferences than those candidates at the bottom. The recommendations displayed at the top in “Potential 
Matches’ Preferences” are more likely to prefer the focal users than those ranked at the bottom. 
Following a between-subject design, we randomly assign users to one of the four groups. We focus on the 
users who have interacted with others to be able to extract their revealed preference. Once a user is 
assigned to a group, we always generate recommendations using the assigned recommendation system to 
assure each subject is exposed to only one treatment. The recommender system refreshes every day, so 
each user will get updated recommendations on a daily basis. New users with no historical data will get 
their recommendations once they start engaging on the platform.   
 
Figure 1. Experiment Design 
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Design of the Recommender Systems 
Our interest in this study is not to design new algorithms but to leverage existing algorithms and 
investigate how different preference information would impact users’ choices and matches differently. 
Researchers in computer science have used two types of models for matching problems; one is profile-
based similarity ranking (Pizzato, et al., 2010) and the other is collaborative filtering (Xia, et al., 2015)2. 
With careful consideration, we decide to not use the collaborative filtering-based model as researchers 
have found that it tends to favor superstars (Lee and Hosanagar, 2014), which may potentially exacerbate 
the congestion among superstars in two-sided matching markets. Following the profile-based similarity 
ranking approach, we implement the recommendation algorithm based on Pizzato et al (2010)’s model, 
which looks for “similar” candidates who are compatible with the preference information based on user 
attributes on profile pages. The algorithm treats users with same profile attributes equivalent despite the 
fact that these users may differ in demand and may be considered differently using collaborative filtering. 
For details of the algorithm, please refer to the original paper (Pizzato, et al, 2010).  
Specifically, the recommender system consists of three parts – input preference data, feature set, and 
model as shown in Figure 2. For the three recommender systems, we use the same feature set and 
recommendation model to make sure the only difference across “Your Preferences,” “Potential Matches’ 
Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” recommender systems are the input preference data. Specifically, 
the input preference data in “Your Preferences” recommender system is extracted from those people who 
are visited or contacted by the focal users. The input preference data in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” 
recommender system is extracted from those people who have initiated visits and messages to the focal 
users, and that in “Mutual Preferences” recommender system is extracted from the historical partners 
with back-and-forth visitation and conversations. We then extract features from these profiles to form 
preferences. 
 
 
Figure 2. Components of Recommender Systems 
 
The specific features we extract to represent one’s preference are primarily based on the profile 
information since in general people rely on these profile attributes to make decisions. The features include 
the age difference between the focal user and potential candidates, location proximity, number of photos, 
income, education, length of self-introduction, and immigration status. We also include tenure-length as 
one feature as users, especially long-time users, are very familiar with all the other old users on the 
platform and thus they may pay more attention to new users.  
                                                             
2 Other supervised machine learning techniques may also be applied to recommender systems in two-
sided matching markets but, to the best of our knowledge, have not been studied in previous papers. At 
least in our context, there is data limitation that only positive cases are available (i.e., who likes whom) 
but no negative ones (i.e., who dislike whom) that make supervised models generally not feasible.  
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We create potential selection pool for each focal user using the active users over the last two weeks to 
make sure the potential candidates have been recently active, to maximize the response and engagement. 
For each user, we exclude the ones that they have visited over the last three months to create a customized 
selection pool for each user that aims to generate useful recommendations rather than redundant 
information. We calculate a compatibility score of each potential candidate within the selection pool and 
we output only the top one hundred compatible candidates for the focal user. The three recommender 
systems work in the same way and only differ in the source of the input preference data. 
Although the focus of this paper is not to develop the best performing recommender systems for matching 
markets, we still seek to improve the existing Pizzato et al.’s model. Besides using the profile-based 
ranking to mitigate potential biases, the other improvements are listed as follows. First, while some prior 
work use stated preferences that are described by users in their profile, we mainly use the revealed 
preference based on historical behaviors of each user, which better reflect their true preferences. Along 
this line, we also carefully pre-process the historical information to pick only the initial visitation and 
messages between each pair as this indicates a strong preference compared to visiting back. Moreover, 
while existing studies evaluate new algorithms using secondary data, we design and conduct a randomized 
field experiment to observe the real choices of users. Finally, in order to ensure user engagement and 
observe how users use recommender systems, we update the recommendations on a daily basis. 
Variables  
As we focus on the impact on the focal users, we track their subsequent engagement behaviors upon 
receiving the experiment interventions. To obtain a comprehensive understanding on how different 
recommender systems may play a role in focal user’s decision-making, we collect outcomes along the 
messaging funnel from message initiation to the other side’s response and to the final match. We follow 
the previous literature in online dating to define matching as a three-round back-and-forth conversation 
since it indicates initial mutual interest of both sides (Bapna et al. 2016; Hitsch et al. 2010).  
We are interested in not only the number of messages initiated by the focal users but also who the focal 
users send the messages to. The number of messages is a direct measure of user engagement to indicate 
the performance of the recommender systems while the qualitative aspect of these choices uncovers 
whether and how the focal users choose the candidates differently. These two dimensions working 
together provides us a better understanding of how the usage of different preference information in the 
recommender systems will impact the interaction and matching outcomes on the platform. We use charm 
to measure the overall desirability of each candidate, which is developed by the collaborating platform to 
track each user’s popularity or demand.  
We calculate these outcome variables within a certain time window denoted by outcome_Xtime. For 
instance, we focus on the outcomes within one week after treatment, so we calculate msg_rec_1week, 
response_rec_1week, and match_rec_1week to examine the messages initiated by the focal user, the 
messages responded by the message receivers, and the final matches formed between the focal users and 
the message receivers. We take a log transformation of these message counts. Further, as focal users can 
also use targeted search as an alternative way to identify potential candidate, we also look at the same 
series of outcomes initiated from the search. These outcomes in parallel serve as an additional check on 
how users are impacted by the introduction of recommender systems. 
To further study the heterogeneous treatment effects, we link the experiment data to subjects’ historical 
behaviors. We are particularly interested in categorizing the users based on their prior-experiment 
decision-making in searching. We segment the users based on search diversity – whether the users search 
broadly or narrowly. We speculate this may relate to their openness to explore “who are interested in me.” 
For each user on the platform, we calculate the standard deviation of the charm scores of those who the 
user visits within two weeks prior to the experiment. We adopt a data-driven approach and choose the 
median of this distribution as the cutoff for “broadness.” The subjects in the experiment are labeled as low 
or high in breadth depending on whether the value is below or above the threshold. The detailed coding of 
each variable is listed in Table 1.   
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Outcome Variables Description 
msg_rec_1week the total messages sent to recommended candidates  
response_rec_1week the total responses of recommended candidates 
match_rec_1week the total matches of recommended candidates 
msg_search_1week the total messages sent to candidates from search  
response_search_1week the total responses of candidates from search 
match_search_1week the total matches of candidates from search 
User Characteristics Description 
Charm charm score based on popularity 
Table 1. Individual-level Variable Description 
Results and Discussion 
Since the randomization is done at the focal user level, we use post-experiment individual-level data to 
run OLS regressions across experiment groups. We focus on the subsequent behaviors within one week 
after the treatment. Since gender difference has been noted in previous literature (Hitsch et al., 2010; 
Ravi et al., 2016), we block on gender in the randomization and run all the regression analyses for males 
and females respectively. 
We first examine the quantity change across groups to see if the introduction of recommender systems 
leads to more message initiation from the focal users. Presumably, if the recommender system provides 
personalized choices that fit one’s needs better, it should outperform the baseline algorithm even though 
we choose a relatively high baseline using top popular users with customization. As shown in Table 2, 
users in “Your Preferences” group on average initiate more messages than those in the control group, 
which further assures that the model and features in use work well in practice. More importantly, “Mutual 
Preference” and “Your Preference” groups also outperform the control group. There is no statistically 
significant difference in message initiation across the three treatment groups with different recommender 
systems, indicating that providing recommendations using the other side’s preference has an equivalent 
scale of positive effect on the engagement of focal users. 
 
 Male Female 
VARIABLES msg_rec msg_rec 
Your Preference 0.0272* 0.0238** 
 (0.0155) (0.0101) 
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.0514*** 0.0234** 
 (0.0155) (0.0101) 
Mutual Preference 0.0236* 0.0336*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0106) 
Constant 0.0725*** 0.0231*** 
 (0.0109) (0.00711) 
Observations 5,559 5,196 
p-value(“Your”= “Potential”) 0.119 0.968 
p-value(“Your”= “Mutual”) 0.825 0.356 
p-value(“Potential”= “Mutual”) 0.112 0.336 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2. The Number of Messages That Focal Users Initiate to Recommended Candidates 
The result becomes even more interesting when we couple it with the qualitative analysis of the message 
receivers in each group, as shown in Table 3. Chosen is a dummy variable that documents whether a 
recommendation is chosen by the focal user for further contact. By comparing the chosen candidates with 
the unchosen candidates for each focal user across groups, we find that the average desirability or charm 
scores of the message receivers in “Your Preference” group are higher than the charm scores of the 
unchosen candidates. However, the charm scores of chosen candidates in “Potential Matches’ Preference” 
group and “Mutual Preference” group are not always higher than the unchosen candidates. In other words, 
without the other side’s information provided, focal users tend to pick the more desirable users from the 
Recommender Systems in Two-sided Matching Markets 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 9 
list of recommended candidates. Yet when the matching side’s preference is available, they value such 
information and are willing to choose those less desirable candidates who have a higher chance of 
preferring them. The increases in reaching out in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” group and “Mutual 
Preferences” group are as significant as the increase in “Your Preference” group despite the fact that the 
increases are potentially driven by different mechanisms. Users in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and 
“Mutual Preferences” react on the access to candidates who are more likely to prefer themselves while the 
users in “Your Preferences” group become more proactive due to a good fit to their own preference. It is 
possible that users are curious about the novel and diverse choice sets generated by leveraging the other 
side’s preferences, and browsing these profiles may lead to conversions to conversations. It is also 
possible that users tend to utilize the prediction of the other side’s preference and act upon it to maximize 
the response rate. 
VARIABLES Male Female 
Your Preference -0.0145** -0.00628 
 (0.00614) (0.00416) 
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.00941 0.0117*** 
 (0.00610) (0.00416) 
Mutual Preference 0.00676 0.00313 
 (0.00656) (0.00442) 
Chosen 0.0220*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.00763) (0.00576) 
Your Preference & chosen 0.0542*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00853) 
Potential Matches’ Preference & chosen -0.0492*** -0.0594*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00840) 
Mutual Preference & chosen -0.0444*** -0.0375*** 
 (0.0137) (0.00954) 
Constant 8.558*** 7.854*** 
 (0.00431) (0.00299) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3. Desirability Comparison Between Chosen Candidates and Non-chosen Candidates 
across Groups 
Furthermore, users are not bounded by the limited recommendation choices at all as they have a search 
tool to locate users they prefer. They have equal access to desirable partners with the same search cost 
using the generic target search. In other words, each user has full access to everyone on the platform using 
the search tool plus an additional subset of recommended candidates. The focal users contacting 
candidates with lower charm scores in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” is not because users have no 
access to other more desirable candidates but because they intend to choose those candidates who may be 
“less popular” but are more likely to be “interested in themselves.” As robustness checks, we further 
examine how the quantity and quality of message initiation using the search tool are affected at the 
meanwhile. As shown in Table 4, we find there is no statistically significant difference across treatment 
groups in both the numbers of initiated messages and the desirability of the message receivers. It means 
when the provided choices (e.g., from target search) do not contain the other side’s preference, the focal 
users in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups make decisions similarly as 
their counterparts in “Your Preferences” group. 
 
 Male Female Male Female 
VARIABLES msg_search msg_search charm charm 
My Preference -0.00719 -0.000929 -0.0107 -0.0255 
 (0.0208) (0.0192) (0.0176) (0.0378) 
Potential Matches’  
Preference 
0.0167 0.00926 -0.00615 0.0188 
 (0.0207) (0.0192) (0.0176) (0.0377) 
Mutual Preference 0.0251 0.00736 0.0114 0.0379 
 (0.0218) (0.0201) (0.0185) (0.0395) 
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Constant 0.261*** 0.229*** 8.026*** 7.633*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0266) 
Observations 5,559 5,196 5,559 5,196 
p-value 
(“Your”= “Potential”) 
0.250 0.597 0.795 0.243 
p-value 
(“Your”= “Mutual”) 
0.140 0.681 0.234 0.110 
p-value 
(“Potential”= “Mutual”) 
0.700 0.925 0.344 0.629 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4.  The Number of Messages That Focal Users Initiate to and the Desirability of 
Receivers Using Search 
We further examine responses and matches along the messaging funnel. As shown in Table 5, we find that 
the positive effect of the recommender systems carries on, which leads to an increase in replies in all 
treatment groups. More importantly, “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups 
get even more responses than “Your Preferences” group. Similarly, we find the introduction of the 
recommender systems leads to an increase in final matches in all treatment groups, and “Potential 
Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups benefit from even more matches on average than 
“Your Preferences” group. Overall, providing the other side’s preferences (“Potential Matches’ Preferences” 
and “Mutual Preferences”) does lead to more matches than only using the focal user’s preferences (“Your 
Preferences”). This outcome gap in matching between “Your Preferences” and the other two groups is 
mainly driven by two aspects. Firstly, conditional on similar numbers of messages sent out, users in 
“Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups are more likely to get a response, 
which plays an important role in the conversion of final matches. Secondly, the chosen candidates in 
“Your Preferences” group are more popular than those in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual 
Preferences” groups, and thus these candidates from “Your Preferences” group tend to have less 
bandwidth than those in the other two groups to deal with the extra incoming messages due to the 
introduction of recommender systems. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5. The Number of Responses and Matches That Focal Users Received from 
Recommendation 
 
Finally, we investigate the heterogeneous effects of each recommender system on different user types to 
gain more insights on what user type would benefit the most from which recommender system. We do 
 Responses Matches 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
     
Your Preference 0.0120* 0.00933** 0.00819 0.00566 
 (0.00663) (0.00396) (0.00545) (0.00349) 
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.0365*** 0.0219*** 0.0192*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.00661) (0.00395) (0.00543) (0.00349) 
Mutual Preference 0.0259*** 0.0188*** 0.0199*** 0.0134*** 
 (0.00696) (0.00414) (0.00572) (0.00365) 
msg_rec_1week 0.0644*** 0.118*** 0.0575*** 0.0869*** 
 (0.000861) (0.00119) (0.000708) (0.00105) 
Constant 0.0138*** -0.00255 0.00631 -0.00302 
 (0.00467) (0.00278) (0.00384) (0.00246) 
     
Observations 5,559 5,196 5,559 5,196 
p-value(“Your”= “Potential”) <0.001 0.001 0.043 0.024 
p-value(“Your”= “Mutual”) 0.046 0.023 0.042 0.036 
p-value(“Potential”= “Mutual”) 0.131 0.446 0.906 0.956 
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find that recommender systems have a differential impact on different users. We are particularly 
interested in segmenting users based on their search patterns. Specifically, the user type here is based on 
whether a user searches narrowly or broadly. Interestingly, as shown in Table 6, we find that users who 
search broadly have a significant increase in message initiation when offered with “Potential Matches’ 
Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” whereas “Your Preference” leads to a significant increase in 
message sending among users who search narrowly. This is consistent with the trend where users who 
search broadly are more likely to be more open-minded to candidates who are not typically their own 
“type” while people who are particular about choices and have a narrow search may tend to stick to their 
own preferences. In addition, given documented gender differences in online dating, it is worth 
mentioning that female and male users have a consistent pattern in response to each recommender 
system. 
 Male  Female  
 Narrow Broad Narrow Broad 
VARIABLES msg_rec msg_rec msg_rec msg_rec 
     
Your Preference 0.0468** -0.0139 0.0546** 0.0230 
 (0.0224) (0.0414) (0.0230) (0.0154) 
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.0319 0.251*** 0.0317 0.0291* 
 (0.0224) (0.0418) (0.0225) (0.0154) 
Mutual Preference 0.0193 0.0330 0.0402* 0.0432*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0436) (0.0237) (0.0160) 
Constant 0.103*** 0.0535* 0.0199 0.0326*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0291) (0.0159) (0.0108) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6. Messages That Focal Users Initiate to Candidates -Segmented by Search Broadness 
 
Conclusion  
User recommendation is often deemed as one of the keys to mitigate search friction and matching 
inefficiency in two-sided matching markets, but much less attention, both in industry and in academia, 
has been paid compared to product recommendations in transactional markets. With an emphasis on the 
fundamental characteristics of user recommendation in two-sided matching markets, our study seeks to 
fill this gap by starting at examining whether and how the provision of potential candidates’ preference 
can positively impact users’ decision-making and overall matching on the platform. 
In collaboration with a leading online dating platform, we carefully design recommender systems with the 
same algorithm but only alter the preference information in use. We design and conduct a randomized 
field experiment to investigate how the recommender system using only the focal user’s preference (i.e., 
“Users who you might prefer”) plays a different role than the recommender systems using the other side’s 
preference (i.e., “Users who might prefer you” and “Users who you might prefer and who might prefer 
you”). Very interestingly, we find that the focal users are willing to initiate messages to less desirable users 
than their counterparts when they are aware that these recommended candidates are likely to be 
interested in them. These focal users end up sending no fewer messages to these candidates “who may be 
interested in them” compared to their counterparts sending to those “who they may be interested in.” 
Moreover, when it comes to responses and matches, the advantage of incorporating the other side’s 
preference is further consolidated; the focal users in “Your Preference” group get a smaller increase in 
responses and matches than users in the other two groups. Clearly, users are sensitive and responsive to 
“the other side’s preference” and value candidates who are likely to prefer them regardless of these 
candidates’ desirability. It leads to a higher volume of matches since the message receivers in “Potential 
Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups have a higher probability of responding. Further, 
these recommender systems display a differential impact on different users based on the diversity of their 
historical search. Users who search broadly are more responsive to “People who might prefer themselves” 
and “Mutual Preferences” while users who search narrowly are more interested in “People who we might 
prefer.” 
Recommender Systems in Two-sided Matching Markets 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 12 
Our work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we are among the first to acknowledge the 
fundamental characteristics of user recommender systems in two-sided matching markets and study the 
design and impact of user recommendations. The study extends the existing literature on the impact of 
recommender systems. Second, there is emerging literature that studies how the provision of the 
preference information from the sender will affect the decisions of the receiver, but there is no study 
examining the implications on recommender systems. Our findings, therefore, complement this line of 
work and add empirical evidence to a different setting where the preference information is prediction, and 
the preference signal is not directly sent by the sender. Finally, in terms of identification strategies, we are 
among the first to design and conduct a randomized field experiment to examine the impact of user 
recommendations in a two-sided matching market.  
Our findings provide practical insights to the platform designers. The results suggest multiple benefits of 
incorporating the other side’s preference into the recommender systems. Besides the greater volume of 
user engagement and final matches, more importantly, these recommender systems facilitate the 
discovery of “seemingly unusual” matches. Without any information on the other side, the focal user can 
only act on their own preferences and look for their preferred “types.” However, with the other side’s 
preference information available upfront, the focal users increase the efficiency of their search but also 
have access to a broader array of “types” they would not have reached out to otherwise. Driven either by 
curiosity or efficiency improvements, the focal users get a chance to learn about these candidates by 
browsing their profiles and talking to them, which in turn leads to more matching opportunities for the 
focal users. This also mitigates the overloading problem of superstars as more matches are discovered in 
this manner. Future work can examine how the different recommendation systems impact the user and 
effectiveness of targeted search mechanisms for different user segments. 
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